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Kamal-Deen: The Anatomy of Gulf of Guinea Piracy

THE ANATOMY OF GULF OF GUINEA PIR AC Y
Commander Ali Kamal-Deen, Ghana Navy

A

s a global response to piracy off the coast of Somalia was taking place, alarm
bells were ringing about a similar growing insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea.
Today, the Gulf of Guinea stands as the most dangerous maritime area in terms
of the success rate of attacks and violence. The United Nations Security Council
adopted Resolutions 2018 (in 2011) and 2039 (in 2012) expressing grave concern
about the mounting insecurity in the region and its consequences for regional
and global security.1 A United Nations (UN) team was deployed to the region to
assess the situation.2
The UN resolutions and the report of the assessment team called on regional
states and institutions, as well as the international community, to respond, and
a code of conduct for the repression of piracy was
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developments reinforce the urgency of effective counterpiracy measures. Realistically, however, the success and efficacy of both regional and global response
will depend on a sound knowledge of the operational environment, awareness of
the actors, and most crucially, understanding of how the situation has evolved.
This article provides a critical analysis of the piracy situation in the Gulf of
Guinea. It sets the background with an overview of piracy statistics and a categorization of the coast according to the degree of risk of attack. This is followed by
an examination of the paradigm of Gulf of Guinea piracy, while the third section
analyzes the evolution of the piracy from its pre-2005 low levels into a regional
and global threat. The fourth section summarizes Gulf of Guinea piracy and examines future projections. The article concludes with a discussion of the imperatives for enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It should be noted
first that the geographical scope of the region referred to as the Gulf of Guinea
varies depending on the issue or interest at stake. It is defined in this article as
comprising the coastal states stretching from Senegal to Angola and as embracing
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS).6
OVERVIEW AND DISTRIBUTION OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY
INCIDENTS
Piracy has historically been a threat to maritime trade and the good order of the
world’s oceans.7 To ensure the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs),
international law imposes an obligation on states to cooperate in the repression
of piracy; it also grants universal jurisdiction over piracy, such that pirates may
be arrested and prosecuted within the legal system of any state.8 The requisite
international framework is codified in articles 100–105 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of 1982.9
To be classified as piracy, an act of piracy or depredation must have taken place
on the high seas.10 The “high seas” in this context include contiguous zones and
exclusive economic zones. In contrast to piracy, the terms “armed robbery against
ships,” “armed robbery at sea,” or simply “armed robbery” denote piratical acts
or thefts that take place within a territorial sea, internal waters, or, by extension,
archipelagic waters, ports, and anchorages.11 For practical purposes, however,
piracy and armed robbery pose similar threats to the safety and security of global
shipping, and the drivers and motivations behind the two crimes are largely the
same despite the legal distinction.12 For this reason “piracy” is used in this article
to cover both types of incidents.
Piracy Statistics in the Gulf of Guinea
Although the Gulf of Guinea has its own history of sea raids and piratical acts,
they did not constitute a major threat until recently.13 Within the past few years
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/7
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the region has seen a significant rise in piracy incidents. Table 1 reflects incidents from 2005 to 2013, as compiled from International Maritime Organization
(IMO) reports.14
The rising threat of piracy is evident. Attacks went from twenty-three in 2005
to sixty in 2007. For reasons that will be covered below, the incidents decreased
in 2008 and 2009, but they swelled again between 2010 and 2013; 2012 marked a
peak, with sixty-four incidents. The situation is actually worse than the statistics
depict, because, it is believed, unlike in other regions, only about half of the incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are actually reported by ships’ masters and
operators for fear of reprisal during their next visit.15 Even so, since 2009 the Gulf
of Guinea has been identified as the new piracy territory, displacing Somalia,
especially with regard to violence employed in the attacks.16
Piracy constitutes a major threat to SLOC security when incidents are not
confined to ports and anchorages but occur also in territorial waters and, more
importantly, on the high seas. The Gulf of Guinea manifests all these indicators,
and the percentage of successful attacks outside port areas has increased, as shown
in table 1. Robberies and attempted robberies in the territorial sea rose from only
five in 2005 to thirty-one incidents in 2007. The region recorded a single incident
on the high seas in 2005; the number jumped tenfold the following year, and the
number of successful attacks on the high seas has since grown. As early as 2006,
pirates hijacked a Russian oil tanker, Shkotovo, about sixty nautical miles off Guinea using automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), manifesting their
ability to hijack vessels far out to sea and their willingness to employ high levels of
violence.17 Significantly, seventeen out of the twenty-five high-seas attacks in 2012
were successful, and most attacks in 2013 were against moving vessels.
Piracy Hot Spots and Enclaves
Table 1 covers the entire Gulf of Guinea region, but two qualifications must be
made. First, piracy and robbery incidents have not affected the entire region
continually from 2005 to 2012. Second, even where incidents have been recorded,
their nature and trends are not monolithic. To allow a nuanced perception of the
dynamics of the problem, localities in the Gulf of Guinea can be categorized as
“hot spots,” “enclaves,” or zones of low risk. Piracy hot spots are rated according
to risk and danger of attacks, while enclaves—localities where pirates are based
and from which they operate—are classified as primary or secondary, depending
on the certainty of the presence of piratical groups.
Angola and Cape Verde are areas of low risk; there are hardly any reported
incidents of attacks off their coasts, and the trends on the neighboring coasts are
also limited—the hijacking of the tanker Kerala in February 2014 was the first
major incident off Angola. Incidents in and around the Democratic Republic of
Continued on page 97
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the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Senegal are also limited to theft from ships
in ports and anchorages, as well as occasional robberies in territorial seas. Attacks
off the coasts of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea have declined substantially
since 2009, thus removing these two states from a high-risk ranking.
Recent multiple attacks, in contrast, have made Cote d’Ivoire a piracy hot spot.
Sierra Leone is in the same category, because although attacks off that coast are
fewer than off Cote d’Ivoire, they are very violent.
Guinea is both a piracy hot spot and the region’s secondary piracy enclave.
Attacks off its coast since 2009 have been characterized by heavy use of weapons,
violence, and sophistication. Shkotovo (as noted) and Maersk Belfast were attacked in 2006 with automatic rifles and RPGs;18 Isola Verde and Songa Emerald
were successfully boarded while under way in 2009 and 2010, respectively;19
more recently, in 2012, armed pirates attacked the Maltese-flagged Constanza
twenty nautical miles off Guinea, causing major damage to the ship.20 It is the
frequency and similarity of these attacks that suggest the existence of a piracy
base in Guinea and its environs.
The coasts of Nigeria, Benin, and Togo are collectively the most dangerous in
the region. However, Nigeria stands out as the epicenter of Gulf of Guinea piracy
and as the primary piracy enclave. Nigeria alone accounts for 80 percent of reported incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.21
THE PARADIGM OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY
What fundamentally drives piracy, especially in its primary enclave? Who are the
primary actors responsible? Answers can be traced in the transmutation of an
insurgency into a ravaging piracy network.
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is a loose coalition of militant groups that emerged in 2005 in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, ostensibly seeking a greater share of oil revenue for the region.22 A Joint Revolutionary
Council surfaced in 2006 as an umbrella organization for MEND and other,
splinter groups;23 MEND is the most dominant and cohesive.24 MEND claims to
fight for “community” interests, but intense criminality dominates its practical
existence and activities.25 From its very inception, expatriate workers have been
regularly kidnapped by MEND activists for ransom at each okrika—area or axis
of control of a subunit or splinter group.26
The MEND insurgency gained notoriety at the strategic level for attacks on
critical installations in the Niger Delta, starting with oil pipelines ashore and
later expanding to offshore oil platforms.27 The federal government of Nigeria
responded with the establishment of a joint task force of security agencies to
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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counter the insurgency. Despite the robustness of the joint task force, MEND
continued to be lethal, engaging government forces in gun battles.28 Three naval
personnel were missing and feared dead in 2007, nine were killed in June 2008,
and three in April 2009.29
Rising Threat and the Amnesty Pact
In late 2008, after almost four years of insurgent attacks, the federal government
of Nigeria entered into negotiations with MEND; a formal amnesty proclamation
resulted in June 2009.30 This rapprochement was influenced by the increasing
threat posed by insurgents to oil security, as epitomized by a successful attack on
the floating production, storage, and off-loading unit (FPSO) Bonga in 2008.31
The attack had serious implications for Nigeria, the wider Gulf of Guinea, and
beyond. The Bonga attack marked a peak in a series of threats to energy security
in the Gulf of Guinea, and it opened a new chapter in global asymmetric threats.
Indeed, excluding the attack on Aban VII off the coast of India in 2006, the
Gulf of Guinea has recorded the most attacks against offshore platforms in the
world, all of them off the coast of Nigeria.32 Bulford Dolphin, a mobile drilling
rig, was attacked in April 2007 by insurgents.33 In May 2007 Mystras was also
attacked, and three days later Trident VIII was targeted.34 In addition to the
physical damage and personal injuries inflicted by the insurgents, these incidents
impacted the operation of the platforms.35 The attack on Mystras was indeed very
significant, as it marked the second on an FPSO in two years.
These incidents boosted the confidence of the insurgents, and they culminated in the June 2008 attack on the Bonga FPSO—a major hub of the oil giant
Royal Dutch Shell—about 120 kilometers offshore.36 After the incident, Nigeria’s
oil production dropped to its lowest in twenty-five years and global oil prices
soared.37 The Bonga incident heightened global fears that even deep-sea energy
installations were not safe from insurgents and terrorists.38 In a statement MEND
affirmed that its grand objective was to disable oil export operations, described
the attack as a humiliating security breach for the Nigerian military, and warned
that MEND’s “next visit [would] be different.”39 Soon after, the Nigerian government and MEND group leaders came to the negotiation table and entered
into an amnesty pact. The arrangement involved insurgents laying down their
weapons in return for monthly allowances and skills training.40 However, some
commentators have charged that insurgent leaders were accommodated in luxurious hotels alongside high-ranking politicians and influential people and that
the insurgent leadership was to receive financial payoffs.41
The amnesty led to the demobilization of insurgent forces and of the organizational structure of MEND, as well as a decline in its activities starting in late
2008.42 Interestingly, in that period piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea decreased,
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from a high of sixty incidents in 2007 to fifty in 2008, reaching a low of forty-six
in 2009 (as shown in table 1).43 A review of piracy reports by the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) for 2009 and 2010 shows that there were few piratical incidents in the last and first quarters of 2009 and 2010, respectively.44 However, the
arrangement became tenuous thereafter, partly because the amnesty “cake” had
not been shared among all actors (and certainly not in amounts satisfactory to all
members of the insurgency).45 Splinter groups announced an intention to resume
normal campaigns, and in the remainder of 2010 piracy attacks became prevalent once again.46 By the close of 2011 the Gulf of Guinea had recorded sixtyone piracy incidents, a sharp contrast to the low figures of 2009.
An Insurgency, Criminality, Piracy, and Security Complex
It is clear, then, that the creeks of the Niger Delta harbor dangerous pirates who
threaten the security of sea lines of communication in the Gulf of Guinea. Elements of MEND that are no longer attacking offshore oil platforms, kidnapping
offshore workers for ransom, or extorting money from oil companies have turned
to piracy as their principal activity. This insurgency/piracy nexus often exists
among different kinds of organized crime.47 In the Gulf of Guinea, however, piracy is committed with impunity, and insurgents, rather than achieving a symbiotic
relationship with pirates, have fully transformed into pirates themselves.
The crime of piracy is itself only part of a broad spectrum of actions and complexities that constitutes the piracy threat. It may, for instance, be argued that
dealing with the Niger Delta piracy is a matter of trading off one element of security for another. At any point in time—this was especially so prior to the amnesty
process—the Niger Delta insurgency poses a threat to five critical security interests: the national security of Nigeria, the investment security of oil companies,
global energy security, regional security and stability, and finally, the safety and
security of shipping. These five aspects of security are in many ways interlinked.
Insurgent activities impact Nigeria’s economic interests and stability, which are
key components of its national security. Insurgent attacks equally threaten the
investment interests of oil companies, as well as global energy security, the safety
and security of shipping, and regional stability. For Nigeria, safeguarding national
security became paramount following such incidents as the Bonga attack, making
the security of shipping a lesser concern. Oil companies initially secured their
investments by succumbing to the extortion demands of insurgent groups.48 The
amnesty arrangement offered assurance, albeit temporary, of Nigerian national
security, oil investment security, and by extension, the contribution of Nigeria’s
oil to global energy security. But protecting those security interests left regional
security and the security of shipping in peril. That peril may be regarded as unintended, or it can be viewed as Nigeria sacrificing one element of security interest
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for the other; indeed, as far as the shipping industry was concerned, Nigeria has
had “no political will to combat the problem of piracy.”49
EVOLUTION OF THE NIGER DELTA INSURGENCY INTO A
REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY THREAT
The Niger Delta insurgency has evolved over time from the primary piracy enclave into a region-wide security threat, in scope, tactics, and trends. As in many
criminal progressions, the exact dates of transitions are difficult to pinpoint but
the patterns are discernible. What follows is a summary of the seven phases of the
evolution from 2005 through to the hijacking of Orfeas in October 2012.
Opportunistic Sea Robbery
The first phase of Gulf of Guinea piratical attacks may be described as “opportunistic sea robbery.” This taxonomy fits piracy incidents up to 2005 but also applies
in part as late as 2007. Two-thirds of attacks during this period took place in ports
and anchorages, interspersed with a limited number of robberies in the territorial sea. It needs to be emphasized, though, that the description of this phase of
piracy as “opportunistic” is not about the capability of the actors but highlights
the fact that robberies were conducted as subsidiary activities. The attention of
insurgents during this period was on attacking offshore platforms; some ships,
however, were hijacked and crews kidnapped for ransom.
Piracy reports during this period gave indications of what would become central in the profile of threats to SLOC security—that is, gangs of hijackers using
speedboats armed with heavy weapons. The use of speedboats can be contrasted
with Somalia piracy, wherein fishing vessels and skiffs are the principal platforms.
In 2006, four crew members of Northern Comrade were kidnapped for ransom.
In May 2007, over forty people armed with guns in six speedboats attacked Dlb
Cheyenne, engaged the Nigerian military in a shoot-out, and kidnapped the crew;
in the same month Oloibiri was attacked using explosives and its crew kidnapped
for ransom.50 Thus the tactic of kidnapping and ransoming expatriate oil workers
was being employed in conjunction with the hijacking of ships.
Widening the Enclave: Prodding and Surges
By 2009 there were signs of a new characteristic of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
Unlike Somalia, where pirates set out to hunt for victim ships, pirates in the Gulf
of Guinea undertake surgical attacks, converging at locations of interest.51 Activities of insurgents during this period expanded beyond the southern and western
coasts of Nigeria, westerly swarms targeting vessels off the coast of Benin, and
those to the south attacking ships off Cameroon and the neighboring coast. In
2008 about ten armed persons in military clothing boarded the cement carrier
Elbia off the island of Bioko in Equatorial Guinea, identified themselves as
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/7
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Nigerian rebels, demanded food from the ship’s crew, and after six hours on
board disembarked into speedboats. Accounts of piracy incidents off nearby
coasts in 2008 described the pirates and robbers as “Nigerian rebels,” “Nigerian
militants,” and “protectors of the Bonny River.”52
These surges signaled an ability of the insurgents to increase the intensity and
extend the scope of their activities, with widening security consequences. This
was demonstrated by the alleged involvement of Niger Delta insurgents in a seaborne attack on the presidential palace of Equatorial Guinea in February 2009.53
The incident was the catalyst for the establishment of a subregional maritime
security framework by member states of the Economic Community of Central
African States in 2009.54 Despite the challenges confronting the ECCAS maritime framework (including inadequate logistics, funding, and legal framework),
it nonetheless weakened the southern wing of the insurgents, resulting in fewer
incidents in the southern Gulf of Guinea.
Pursuit and Violence
A further evolution of tactics became manifest in 2009 as the insurgents started
hunting vessels to attack, albeit selectively, but often with great violence. Once a
high-value target was identified, it was shadowed farther out to sea and at a vulnerable location was attacked violently. In February 2009 grenades were thrown
at the oil tanker Front Chief, killing a crew member. Seamen on board Emirates
Swam, Sevastopolskaya Buhta, and other vessels also suffered serious injuries
during attacks the same year.55 The high level of violence not only ensured quick
outcomes but compensated for the absence of sanctuaries where vessels could be
kept during ransom negotiations and moved the Gulf of Guinea toward the employment by pirates of violence and killing to subjugate theaters of operations.56
Full-Scale Insurgent Piracy
The transition from insurgency into full-scale piracy was a post-amnesty phenomenon, following the withdrawal of insurgent elements from the amnesty deal
of 2010. Attacks became more prevalent from 2010 through to 2013. They also
became more brazen, as indicated by the chasing of and firing on Elbtank Germany for over an hour and the shadowing of Cape Bon for two days, in February
and March 2011, respectively.57
In this transformation pirates have developed new measures. A variant of the
mother-ship concept has emerged wherein pirates use hijacked fishing vessels
to store fuel for extended operations. That is similar to Somali methods, but in
the Gulf of Guinea it is primarily a deception measure to get close to oil vessels.
Pirates have targeted especially ships loaded with refined oil, which they always
siphon into smaller tankers and then sell illegally, both within and outside the
region.58
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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Regional Threat and Piracy Networks: The Benin Case
That the threat of piracy had become regional by mid-2011 was made evident by
multiple incidents off the coast of Benin. Piracy off the coast of Benin was by no
means new, but unlike earlier cases the June–July 2011 attacks amounted to an
invasion of Benin’s coastal space. The pirates of the Niger Delta had expanded
their enclave to Benin.59 Two significant trends emerged from the 2011 Benin
attacks, the first of which defies normal risk analysis regarding the safety and
security of ships. It is usual to assume that ships in port are shielded from violent
piracy, and crews normally lower their security posture, expecting at most only
minor robberies and minimal violence by actors from within the coastal state.
This assumption was crushed when pirates of the Niger Delta actually entered
port areas of Benin to hijack vessels. One ship, Aristofanis, was sailed to the open
sea, where its cargo was discharged.60
The second piracy trend that became apparent in the Benin onslaught was the
emergence of a growing transnational criminal network in the Gulf of Guinea.
This is evident from the hijacking of Duzgit Venture.61 The captain was forced
to sail the vessel all the way to the coast of Gabon, where the pirates planned to
transfer the oil into a barge. When the pirates failed to meet the barge, the captain
was forced to sail off Warri, Nigeria, to lighter the cargo. After a series of unsuccessful attempts to do so, the pirates disembarked into fast boats, kidnapping the
captain and another crew member. The pirates were in cahoots with other actors
about four thousand kilometers away from the point of hijack, and to meet them
they sailed the commandeered ship across the coastal waters of five states.62 The
incident also raises serious question about the capability of Gulf of Guinea states
to monitor their maritime domains.
Togo in the Claws: Post–Operation PROSPERITY
The multiple piracy attacks off the coast of Benin had a staggering economic impact on the country, including an estimated port-revenue loss of U.S.$81 million
in 2011.63 The president of Benin took two diplomatic steps in response to the
crisis. At the multilateral level, he requested the support of the international community, through the United Nations secretary-general.64 Second, he sought the
support of his counterpart in Nigeria.65 In August 2011 the two states launched
joint patrols; known as Operation PROSPERITY, they lasted a year and concentrated largely on the coast of Benin. Benin had operational command over the
patrols, while tactical command was exercised by Nigeria.66
Within months, a UN report indicated that Operation PROSPERITY had led to
a reduction in piratical incidents off the coast of Benin.67 This was corroborated
by the military chief of Benin.68 However, the fundamental question that should
have been asked was, What has been the effect of PROSPERITY on the immediate
regions of Nigeria and Benin?
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/7
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Since the launch of Operation PROSPERITY there has been, on the one hand, a
steady decrease in piracy off the coast of Benin, but on the other hand, an emergence of incidents off the Togolese coast.69 Interestingly, attacks off the Togolese
coast coincide with periods of few or none reported off Nigeria and Benin. Some
have occurred deep inside port areas of Togo, like the earlier attacks in Benin.
The IMB has noted that the Togo coast has become a piracy hot spot, with incidents increasing from a single attack in 2008 to fifteen in 2012.70 This indicates
that Operation PROSPERITY had simply pushed pirates and robbers farther to the
west. The short coastlines of Benin and Togo have allowed pirates to treat the two
coasts tactically as a single theater of operations. This can be inferred from two
reported incidents in September 2011.71 On the 14th, at 4:15 am, armed robbers
attacked Abu Dhabi Star, a Singapore-flagged chemical tanker, a few nautical
miles off Lomé, Togo, but aborted the attack upon being noticed by the ship’s
company. Four hours earlier, at 11:52 pm, two gangs of pirates had hijacked two
tankers, Mattheos I and Northern Bell, that were conducting a ship-to-ship transfer, sixty-two nautical miles off Benin. The pirates succeeded in sailing Mattheos
I to an unknown location, but the crew of Northern Bell regained control of their
ship.
Analysis of these two incidents, taking into account time, location, and distance, suggests that the same gang of Niger Delta pirates that lost control of
Northern Bell off the Benin coast sailed toward Togo, and then paid their predatory visit to Abu Dhabi Star. The IMB subsequently confirmed that Nigerian
pirates have expanded into Togolese waters.72
Cote d’Ivoire under Siege: Nowhere Is Safe
The hijacking of Orfeas in October 2012 marked the seventh phase of the evolution of piracy from a primary enclave in the Niger Delta into a well-entrenched
regional threat. Orfeas was hijacked on 6 October 2012 off the coast of Cote
d’Ivoire.73 Gaining control of the vessel, the pirates sailed it over two thousand
kilometers to the Niger Delta and stole the oil cargo, releasing the vessel two days
later.74 The hijacking encapsulates most of the tactics already discussed but also
brings to the fore the new sophistication of Gulf of Guinea piracy. Soon after the
hijacking, the pirates took the vessel into deeper water, both to make contact with
their criminal networks and to put the ship out of reach of rescue. In December
2012, armed pirates with machine guns attacked another oil tanker in a Cote
d’Ivoire port.75 These incidents show that attacks in the western Gulf of Guinea
have become more brazen.
EMERGENT PROFILE AND FUTURE PROJECTION
This seven-phase evolution shows that in the absence of robust responses the pirates are likely to consolidate and expand their activities. Effective counterpiracy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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action must take into account the modus operandi of pirates, the piracy profile,
and emerging trends. By the close of 2012, the evolving piracy profile of the Niger
Delta pirates had crystallized, as summarized in table 2.
The above profile reflects a primary focus on the Niger Delta. However, Gulf
of Guinea piratical activity is now marked by fluidity and increasing complexity.
Effective responses should therefore assume the scope of the broader maritime
security context, with particular attention on the evolving piracy track and criminal networks. The following trends should be closely watched.
Widening of the Niger Delta Factor
Unlike Somalia, where multilateral counterpiracy efforts have led to a steady decline in successful attacks since 2009, the Gulf of Guinea has seen an escalation.76
This suggests that pirates in the region are mastering its geography and shipping
profile. Distance is not a limiting factor for piratical activities; conversely, longrange attacks give pirates more time to plunder ships and transfer stolen cargo.
Clearly, there is no area in the Gulf of Guinea too remote or too secure for piracy.
Indeed, in the primary piracy enclave we see two mutually reinforcing developments: consolidation and further widening. It is logical for the Niger Delta
pirates to continue to view the coasts of Nigeria, Benin, and Togo as their normal
TABLE 2
PROFILE OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY AS OF 2012
Subject

Description/Outcome

Platforms

Speedboats, already used by insurgents. Ideal for piracy because of their speed and maneuverability.
Generally faster than victim ships and naval ships.

Grouping

Up to forty pirates in multiple speedboats. Large numbers ideal for overpowering crews.

Weapons

AK-47s, machine guns, RPGs, grenades, and knives. Able to stop ships under way with firepower.

Violence

High level of violence and injury to crew. Instills fear and ensures quick outcome of attacks.

Reach/range

Southward: Nigeria to Equatorial Guinea (over 1,550 km). Westward: Nigeria to Cote d’Ivoire (over
2,000 km).

Time

Operate day and night but shifting more to night operations. Surprise achieved through night
attack.

Target ships

Oil and product tankers; objective to steal refined oil cargo. Other vessels attacked for money and
valuables.

Mother ship

Hijacked fishing vessels occasionally used as resupply basis or as decoy when approaching targeted
ships.

Assisting ships

Tankers used to transfer stolen oil cargo.

Ransom

Increasingly not a prime motivation but still employed as a supplementary activity.

Networks

Stolen oil sold within and outside the region. Timing of attacks suggests prior information about
locations of oil tankers.
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zone while they venture into new areas. This new dynamic was unleashed in January 2014, with the hijacking of Kerala in Angola.77 The tanker was subsequently
sighted under the control of the hijackers off the coast of Nigeria, where part of
the oil cargo, worth eight million U.S. dollars, was stolen.78 This incident signified
a southerly expansion of piracy attacks. The months of June and July saw three
hijackings off Ghana, two of them of oil tankers, signifying a further enlargement
of piracy threat, this time westward.79 These attacks shattered the reputations of
Angola and Ghana as having coast waters among the safest in the region. The incidents also demonstrated that oil tankers will continue to be targeted, because the
financial rewards for the pirates and their accomplices, as well as for buyers of the
stolen oil, are extremely high.80 However, all other vessels are also susceptible prey.
Other Piratical Groups within the Primary Piracy Enclave
But even the primary piracy enclave can get more complicated. There is a history
of attacks by two organized groups in neighboring Cameroon that are completely
removed from the Niger Delta insurgency. One, the Bakassi Freedom Fighters
(BFF), is opposed to Nigeria’s return of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.81 The
BFF attacked an oil tanker in 2008, kidnapping the crew and detaining them for
ten days before negotiating a ransom payment.82 The second group, the Africa
Marine Commando (AMC), kidnapped a Chinese fishing crew in 2010 and extorted a ransom for their release.83 There have been no other discernible piratical
attacks by the BFF or the AMC, partly because of robust responses from the
Cameroon government, including lethal force.84 However, the groups are far from
being dismantled; reports indicate that the AMC was involved in the kidnapping
of local officials in 2011.85
Concerns in the Secondary Piracy Enclave
Another concern is the future safety of the coasts of Guinea and Sierra Leone.
Incidents in this enclave are fewer than off the Niger Delta but worrisome because of the high level of violence employed. There is also a very close correlation
between reported piracy off the coast of Guinea and incidents in neighboring
Sierra Leone—a portent of organized criminal activity in the latter area. In March
2007, pirates armed with machine guns boarded Atropos, which was under way
forty nautical miles off Sierra Leone.86 In August of the same year, thirty pirates
armed with guns boarded a United Kingdom–registered product tanker off
Guinea.87 That December pirates armed with AK-47s and wearing military-like
uniforms fired on and boarded a tanker off Sierra Leone.88 In August 2010, ten
pirates armed with AK-47s attacked a ship off the coast of Guinea;89 more recently, in 2012, a Maltese cargo ship, Costanza, was attacked twenty nautical miles
off Guinea by pirates, again armed with AK-47s, damaging the ship.90 These are
indications of entrenched piratical activity in this secondary enclave.
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Threats beyond Piracy
While the Gulf of Guinea grapples with a spate of piratical activity, new transnational actors are gaining notoriety in the region. The Nigerian extremist Islamist
group Boko Haram, whose activities were previously confined to the northern
part of the country, has broadened its operations across Nigeria and neighboring
states.91 In August 2011, the group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on
the United Nations office in Nigeria, killing eighteen staff and injuring over a
hundred others.92 This attack dramatically changed earlier assessments that had
viewed the group’s threat as limited.93 In June 2013, following repeated attacks
on major cities and towns, the government of Nigeria officially declared Boko
Haram a terrorist group;94 the Nigerian minister of defense emphatically described it as a franchise of Al Qaeda.95
To date, there have been no reports of maritime attacks by Boko Haram. Although a strike on an onshore pipeline in February 2012 by militants “want[ing]
to register their presence” raised fears that Boko Haram may have been targeting
strategic oil assets, no connection with it has been established.96 Nevertheless,
the possibility of Boko Haram or another terrorist group, such as Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), targeting offshore oil and gas installations in the Gulf
of Guinea cannot be discounted.97 Indeed, the high value of these assets, coupled
with their vulnerability, makes them attractive targets.98
COUNTERPIRACY IMPERATIVES
This article has established an increasing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
As attacks spread southward from the secondary enclave in Guinea, a piracy arc
reaching to the primary enclave of the Niger Delta will be formed, leading to a
very grave situation for the safety of shipping, offshore energy security, and the
stability of the region. Effective remedial measures must be adopted by regional
states and the international community. In designing these measures lessons
from recent multilateral efforts in Somalia would certainly be useful, but cognizance should also be given to the distinctive dynamics of this new theater. On the
whole, five thematic areas must be addressed.
Improved Governance
The governance nexus with piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is important. The consequence of a governance deficit goes beyond the spiral of piratical attacks being
witnessed. It also finds expression in a myriad of maritime security challenges, including illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing and illegal migration by sea.99
The 2006 UN Niger Delta Human Development Report provides an incisive
description of the conditions of the people of the Niger Delta.100 The report notes
that the region has “dismal health and health service delivery,” that the people live
in “predominantly . . . poor quality [housing],” and that nearly all school facilities
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/7
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are in “a state of extreme disrepair.” It reports increasing “disillusionment and
frustration,” as well as “deepening . . . deprivation and environmental devastation.”101 Research suggests that the quantity of oil spilled in the Niger Delta over
the last fifty years is more than fifty times the volume spilled in the Exxon Valdez
accident of 1989—one of the greatest environmental disasters the world has ever
witnessed.102 Such poor environmental management has led to serious pollution
and environmental degradation, limiting the opportunity of people to earn a living from either farming or fishing.103
Realistically, therefore, bad governance must be said to lie at the heart of the
maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. Considering the tremendous
oil wealth generated by the Niger Delta region, the dismal social picture painted
by the UN report is otherwise difficult to comprehend. Resentment would be at
its height in such an environment, leading to restiveness, conflict, and crime.104 In
any case, poor governance creates a malignant environment that can be exploited
by pirates and transnational criminal networks.105
Enhanced Capability
The impunity with which ship hijackings are conducted in the Gulf of Guinea, at
times deep inside ports, is symptomatic of weakness in policing, surveillance, and
response capabilities.106 Although security-sector funding is generally inadequate
in the Gulf of Guinea, the situation with respect to navies and coast guards is
especially problematic. Angola’s allocation of resources for the protection of
its maritime estate is typical for Gulf of Guinea states. Angola has an estimated
coastline of 1,600 kilometers—the longest in the region. Its gross domestic
product is the second highest in the region, much of it derived from offshore
resources. Yet the personnel strength of the Angolan navy is only a thousand
(compared to a hundred thousand for Angola’s army and six thousand for its air
force), and its equipment state is palpably inadequate, in contrast to that of the
army.107 The Nigerian navy is similarly underfunded and limited in capability.108
Its personnel strength of eight thousand is the largest in the Gulf of Guinea but
in sharp contrast to the sixty-two-thousand-strong Nigerian army.109 Liberia
represents another anomaly, not just for the Gulf of Guinea but with respect
to how the global maritime community as a whole matches responsibility with
maritime interest. Although Liberia is the second-largest flag state in the world,
its diminutive coast guard has only fifty personnel and eight craft, all under ten
feet in length.110
A quick glance at the other navies and coast guards reveals a similarly
worrisome situation.111 It is evident that the maritime jurisdiction and interest
available to Gulf of Guinea states are not commensurate with the exercise of
responsibility to ensure the safety and security of their coasts.112 This capability
gap must be addressed.
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Effective Legal Framework
An inadequate legal framework too undermines maritime security in the Gulf
of Guinea. Article 100 of UNCLOS encapsulates two interrelated obligations
regarding piracy. States are required, first, to suppress piracy at the national level,
and second, to cooperate with other states in that effort at the regional and international levels.113 To give practical effect to the former, Gulf of Guinea states
must enact and enforce laws covering all aspects of the crime of piracy.114 With
respect to the second obligation, cooperative instruments and structures should
be established that facilitate the sharing of information, at the minimum, and also
possibly lead to joint patrols.
However, Liberia and Togo are the only states in the region that have up-todate piracy legislation.115 It was only in January 2013 that Nigeria initiated the
process of enacting a law to combat piracy and other maritime crimes.116 A UN
assessment mission observed that the definition in the national laws of Benin
of the crime of piracy was outdated and inconsistent with the provisions of
UNCLOS.117 In summary, there is a legislative deficit with respect to the crime
of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, even were states able to patrol their coasts,
they would be unable to prosecute or punish offenders. The likely result would
be a “catch and release syndrome,” as was manifested in the early periods of Somali piracy when counterpiracy forces frequently released apprehended pirates
because of difficulties in prosecution, thus further entrenching insecurity.118 The
Gulf of Guinea states must therefore create an effective counterpiracy regime,
first passing laws against piracy, with accompanying penalties, and second, providing the necessary prosecution and judicial structures.
A related important global instrument is the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 (known
as the 1988 SUA Convention), and its protocols.119 The 1988 SUA Convention
established a basis for responding to a spectrum of violent crimes at sea, from
insurgency to terrorism.120 These crimes tend to fall outside the scope of piracy
as defined by UNCLOS.121 The 1988 SUA Convention has addressed such gaps,
giving Gulf of Guinea states the opportunity to respond effectively to these
threats.
Despite the relevance of the SUA regime, ratification and implementation of
SUA instruments by Gulf of Guinea states have been unsatisfactory. Only Cote
d’Ivoire is a party to all the SUA instruments, but only since 2012.122 Angola,
Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and Nigeria—all of them major oilproducing states with substantial offshore infrastructures—have not ratified the
1988 SUA Fixed Platform Protocol. States that have ratified SUA instruments
have generally failed to incorporate them into their domestic legal systems.123
For example, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria have all ratified the 1988
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SUA Convention, but not one has incorporated the convention into its national
law.124 Since 2004 the UN has emphasized the importance of the SUA framework
for maritime security.125 It is therefore imperative that Gulf of Guinea states
ratify and implement the SUA instruments within their domestic legal and
policy frameworks. They should then develop regional responses, on the SUA
framework.
Robust Regional Cooperation
Maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is increasing; however, it
is crucial that initiatives be tailored to meet the needs of the region. Member
states of the ECCAS in 2009 adopted a Protocol on Maritime Security, based on
a structure that divides the ECCAS grouping into zones to enhance joint patrol,
monitoring, and enforcement.126 This structure is being replicated for the entire
Gulf of Guinea as part of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. For instance, ECOWAS
member states decided to establish a pilot Zone E, comprising Nigeria, Benin,
Togo, and the landlocked state of Niger.127 However, a number of issues have to
be addressed: information sharing, realistic funding, interoperability, and current
and future maritime boundary disputes.128
Viable International Cooperation
International maritime security cooperation too has gained traction in the
Gulf of Guinea; the United States has achieved a good deal of visibility in this
regard. The United States launched its Africa Partnership Station (APS) in 2007
with the deployment of the catamaran HSV-2 Swift and the dock landing ship
USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) to the Gulf of Guinea, and there has since been a
consistent APS presence in the region.129 While serving as a platform for capacity
building and joint exercises, the APS also contributes to the strategic objectives
of power projection and cooperative engagement for the United States through
the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).130 Other U.S. government and policy
institutions, including the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, at Fort McNair in
Washington, D.C., are also engaged in meeting nonmilitary maritime-security
needs of the Gulf of Guinea.
The European Union launched the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf
of Guinea (CRIMGO) project in January 2013.131 The initiative is designed to
improve safety and security off the coasts of seven states.132 Several other states
as well are keenly engaged with the Gulf of Guinea on maritime security, as
epitomized by the increasing port visits of foreign navies in the last couple of
years.133 Even the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy, which traditionally
has had no presence in the region, visited Cameroon in May 2014 and reportedly
undertook antipiracy joint drills with the host country.134 At the multilateral level,
both the International Maritime Organization and the United Nations Office
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on Drugs and Crime have maritime security capacity-building programs in the
Gulf of Guinea. There is also an initiative by the international police community
(INTERPOL) focused on the investigation of maritime-security incidents.135 This
will be a useful means of unearthing patterns of maritime crime and criminal
networks.
Although international cooperation holds out the prospect of enhancing
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a number of challenges have to be
addressed, of which two deserve highlighting here. First is the need for coordination of international partnerships. Multiple cooperative initiatives are currently
being unpacked in the region that national administrators and regional institutions are required to respond to and then implement. They overcrowd national
and regional policy, adversely affecting maritime-security decision making and
coordination. External actors, donor agencies, and relevant international organizations should instead engage with Gulf of Guinea states in a harmonized, coordinated way. Second, while maritime security cooperation is arguably a means
for nonregional states to pursue wider strategic interests, some have made no
allocation of logistical support or funds corresponding to the maritime-security
needs of the region. For example, France pledged only U.S.$1.6 million to support maritime security in 2013, while funding for the CRIMGO project is just
€4.5 million.136 This amounts to a fraction of the annual cost of the NigerianBenin joint patrols (Operation PROSPERITY), estimated by the UN at U.S.$112
million.137
Given the socioeconomic realities in the Gulf of Guinea, where many states
are at the bottom of the global development index, external partnerships should
contribute substantially to the enhancement of capacity and capability.138 An arrangement similar to the trust fund established under the auspices of the IMO
to facilitate counterpiracy initiatives in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden
is recommended for the Gulf of Guinea.139 Of course, the prevailing governance
nemesis in the region makes such a fund susceptible to corruption and abuse.
The framework must therefore have inbuilt mechanisms and checks to ensure
the transparent and efficient application of the fund.
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